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cient attention to the great constitutional protection of privacy
traditionally afforded. Hopefully, methods sanctioned in Dalia will
be strictly limited to those situations in which resort to the twen-
tieth century technology of electronic surveillance is the only way to
provide any measure of adequate law enforcement.9" The
reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment 5 should be the over-
riding concern, and, in light of the protections historically embodied
in the fourth amendment against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the Supreme Court should strictly and explicitly limit con-
stitutional authorization for covert entry to highly scrutinized elec-
tronic surveillance orders.
Elizabeth Hunter Cobb
Rakas v. Illinois:
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND STANDING REVISITED
Defendants were convicted of armed robbery in an Illinois state
court. At trial the prosecution was allowed to offer into evidence a
sawed-off rifle and shells that had been seized without a warrant
from under the seat and from the glove compartment of an
automobile in which the defendants had been passengers. Neither
defendant asserted ownership of the rifle and shells. The Illinois
appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of a motion to sup-
press the evidence, holding that the defendants lacked standing to
object to the alleged unlawful search and seizure.' Affirming the
convictions, the United States Supreme Court for the first time sub-
Sumed standing into the fourth amendment inquiry, determined that
the defendants "made no showing that they had . . . [the necessary)
legitimate expectation of. privacy"' in the areas searched and items
seized, and thus held that the search "did not violate any rights of
these petitioners."' Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
The fourth amendment expressly guarantees "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." In delineating the pro-
94. 441 U.S. at 270 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. See note 2, supra.
1. People v. Rakas, 46 Ill. App. 3d 569, 360 N.E.2d 1252 (1977).
2. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433 (1978).
3. Id. at 434.
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tection thus afforded, the Supreme Court at one time relied upon
the concepts of property rights and trespass for guidance.' But even
those cases decided prior to the abandonment of this approach in
the 1960's' evidenced an awareness of the need for a broader inter-
pretation of the guarantees secured by the fourth amendment.
Significantly, in an 1886 case, Boyd v. United States,6 the Court in
dicta gave judicial recognition to the need for protection of the
rights of "personal security [and] personal liberty [as well as]
private property,"7 stressing that "constitutional provisions for the
security of person and property should be liberally construed. A
close and literal construction deprives them of half of their effi-
cacy .... "' Nonetheless, the Court based its holding upon an inter-
pretation of the fourth amendment tied to property rights' and not
personal rights unrelated to property. With its decision in the 1928
case of Olmstead v. United States,"0 the Court again did not go
beyond the tangible property rights interpretation of the fourth
amendment. Federal officials had tapped the defendant's telephone
wires and thereby obtained information which led to the discovery
of a criminal conspiracy to import, possess, and sell liquor. The
Court, holding that there was no fourth amendment violation
because the wiretapping did not amount to a search and seizure
within the literal meaning of the fourth amendment," emphasized
that no tangible effect was seized, nor was there a physical invasion
of the house."
4. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886); 1 J. VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND IMMUNITIES 9-10 (2d ed. 1974).
5. See text at notes 22-31, infra.
6. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
7. Id. at 630.
8. Id. at 635.
9. In Boyd the Court, relying upon both the fourth and fifth amendments, held
that a statute ordering production of an invoice in an import and duties case was
"unconstitutional and void, .. .and admission [of the invoice] in evidence by the court,
[was] erroneous and unconstitutional." Id. at 638. In discussing the fourth amendment
protection, the Court's rationale focused upon a property rights analysis: "The great
end for which men enter into society was to secure their property. That right is
preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances where it has not been taken
away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole." Id. at 627.
The Court based its interpretation of the fourth amendment upon its understand-
ing of the history of the right in England and the United §tates. Id, at 624-29.
10. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
11. Id.
12. The Court reasoned:
Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to
our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a
defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or
such seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical
1980]
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In 1960 the Court addressed the particular issue of standing 3 to
raise an alleged fourth amendment violation in Jones v. United
States." The majority broadened the interpretation of standing to
raise an alleged fourth amendment violation from protection of
tangible property rights only to an interpretation keyed to one's
legitimate presence on the premises.15 The petitioner alleged no
possessory interest in the seized narcotics and narcotic parapher-
nalia found in a bird's nest in an awning outside an apartment win-
dow, nor did he allege an interest in the apartment greater than the
property law interest of an "invitee or guest."" The government
argued, 7 and the lower courts had held, that a showing of ownership
of the premises was necessary in order to have standing to raise the
issue of an alleged fourth amendment violation. 8 Nonetheless, the
Court refused to import the common law property concepts into
fourth amendment inquiries,'9 thereby indicating a possible depar-
invasion of his house or "curtilage" for the purpose of making a seizure.
Id.
However, Justice Brandeis in dissent foreshadowed the future by pointing out that
'[t]ime works changes,' brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore,
a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which
gave it birth." 277 U.S. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis further argued that the makers of the Constitution undertook to
secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness, recognizing the significance of
man's spiritual nature and that only a part of the
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in tangible things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.
Id. at 478.
13. The Supreme Court earlier had addressed the issue of standing and the fourth
amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Goldstein v. United
States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942). However, these cases did not have the lasting impact that
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), has had. See note 57 & text at notes 14-21,
infra.
14. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
15. Although in Jones the issue of standing was decided upon statutory rather
than constitutional grounds, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e), it has been viewed as
dispositive of the constitutional issue, see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 173
n.6 (1969) (Jones "rule" cited as applicable to fourth amendment standing questions);
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (Jones cited as a case in which the Court
"recognized that the principle object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
privacy rather than property"). See alo Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 189
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
16. 362 U.S. at 259 (emphasis in original).
17. Id. at 265.
18. Id. at 261 & 272.
19. Id. at 266. "We are persuaded, however, that it is unnecessary and ill-advised
to import into the law surrounding the constitutional right . .. subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law." Id.
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ture from the rationale underlying both Olmstead and Boyd, which
was limited to a property rights analysis. With Jones, the Court
chose through standing to broaden the scope of protection afforded
by the substantive right, and thus declined to continue to judge the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the confining, subtle distinctions of property law. 0 With
this action, the Court effectively broadened the scope of protection
of the fourth amendment inasmuch as a property interest as owner
was no longer necessary to obtain standing; rather, the newer and
broader standard would recognize standing in "anyone legitimately
on the premises where the search occurred."'"
In 1967, with Katz v. United States,22 the Court focused its
inquiry directly on the substantive right guaranteed by the fourth
amendment. Faced with governmental intrusion by electronic sur-
veillance (a wiretap) involving no trespass or physical invasion, the
Court purported to break away from the property rights rationale of
the fourth amendment. Justice Stewart, writing for a majority of
the Court, stated that
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or of-
fice, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection .... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.2"
The Court, overruling Olmstead, pointed out that, although a
physical property interest in an area was once thought necessary for
fourth amendment protection, Warden v. Hayden," decided earlier
that same year, had discredited the premise that the classifications
of property rights determine the government's right to search and
seize.25 Also, earlier in the decade, Silverman v. United States"' had
expressly held that the fourth amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but also recordings of oral statements
overheard without a "technical trespass."2 7 Thus, the Court in Katz
dealt a stunning blow to the physical property rights rationale
which had been eroded by Hayden and Silverman and asserted that
"wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain
free from unreasonable searches and seizures."28
20. Id, at 259-60.
21. Id at 267.
22. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
23. I& at 351-52.
24. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
25. Id. at 304.
26. 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
27. I& at 511.
28. 389 U.S. at 359.
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The majority opinion in Katz seemingly severed the fourth
amendment protection from property rights classifications, but left
for later definition the scope of the protection afforded. Justice
Harlan, in a concurring opinion which is now the accepted reading of
Katz,29 clarified the scope of protection to be afforded by noting the
dual inquiry required in determining if protection is available. First,
it must be determined whether the person wishing to invoke the
protection exhibited an actual subjective expectation of privacy,
and, second, whether the expectation is one society is prepared to
recognize as legitimate."0 The latter determination served to temper
the strength of the individual's subjective expectation of privacy by
requiring that it be reasonable.'
With the Katz decision, the Court seemed to have completed a
shift from an interpretation of the substantive fourth amendment
guarantee based on property- rights classifications to one based upon
a "legitimate expectation of privacy." However, in the area of stand-
ing to raise an alleged fourth amendment violation, the Court had
not yet abandoned the property rights analysis. Just two years after
Katz, the Court's holding in Alderman v. United States 2 denied
standing to criminal co-conspirators because they lacked the
necessary property rights interest in the area violated.3 However,
in dicta, the Court recognized the property rights interest of the
absent homeowner in the violated area, declaring that
any petitioner would be entitled to the suppression of govern-
ment evidence ... violative of his own Fourth Amendment right
• . . Such violation would occur if the United States unlawfully
overheard conversations of a petitioner himself or conversations
occurring on his premises, whether or not he was present or par-
ticipated in those conversations.
Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, criti-
cized the majority's treatment of standing due to its inappropriate
29. The Court has lifted Justice Harlan's language for use in subsequent opinions.
See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (1979); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
30. 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
31. In his explanation of the standard, Justice Harlan did not advocate total aban-
donment of the concept of property rights as he indicated that the place where one
manifests his expectation of privacy is a strong factor in determining if the expectation
is reasonable and thus legitimate. Id. A similar view is espoused in a concurring opin-
ion in Rakas. See text at note 47, infra.
32. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
33. Id. at 171. In so doing the Court rejected the defendant's argument that if
evidence is tainted due to a fourth amendment violation, it is inadmissible against
anyone who wishes to raise the issue of taint. I&
34. Id. at 176.
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reliance on property rights and, citing the Court's recent treatment
of the substantive right, wrote:
[W]e have not buried Olmstead, so far as it dealt with the
substance of Fourth Amendment rights, only to give it new life
in the law of standing. Instead, we should reject traditional pro-
perty concepts entirely, and reinterpret standing law in the
light of the substantive principles developed in Katz."
A majority of the Court in Alderman either was unwilling or
thought it unnecessary to reconcile the rationale supporting stand-
ing with the then modified rationale outlining the substantive right
and, therefore, did not draw from the Katz analysis of the substan-
tive right a parallel development in the law of standing. Yet, in
ironic contrast to the hesitancy found in Alderman to commingle the
rationale of standing and the substantive right, the Court had been
willing to use ,the direction of its analysis of standing found in Jones
to influence its interpretation of the substantive right in Katz."
The issue in Jones had been couched in terms of standing to
object to an alleged fourth amendment violation. Prior to Jones, the
petititoner had to claim and prove a proprietary or possessory inter-
est in the object seized or in the premises searched." In Jones, the
Court determined that the petitioner, a visitor to the premises, had
a sufficient interest in the searched premises to establish himself as
a "person aggrieved." 8 In doing so, the Court chose a new standard
no longer based on property rights classifications by which to deter-
mine standing: "anyone legitimately on the premises where the
search was conducted." 9 Following the logic of the proclaimed stan-
35. 394 U.S. at 191 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. In Katz, the Court had cited Jones for the proposition that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment." 389 U.S. at 357 n.18.
37. "To establish 'standing,' Courts of Appeals have generally required that the
movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a
substantial possessory interest in the premises searched." 362 U.S. at 261.
38. The petitioner was using the apartment with the occupant's consent. He had
slept in the apartment, kept extra clothes in the apartment, and had a key to the
apartment. Id. at 259. Although these facts may not have been sufficient to constitute
a substantial property interest, the Court, under its new standard, found them suffi-
cient to establish the petitioner as a person aggrieved.
39. Id. at 267. The Court in Jones also granted automatic standing to object to an
alleged fourth amendment violation when the crime is a possessory offense. This was
done in order to address the dilemma of defendants who might want to raise a
challenge to the search and seizure but who, in order to have standing to object, would
have to claim ownership or possession of the item seized or a substantial possessory
interest in the area searched. If the motion to suppress failed, the petitioner would
have in effect incriminated himself by claiming possession of the property. Id. at
261-64.
It should be noted that a similar dilemma was addressed by the Court in 1968 in
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dard of Jones, the Court in Katz moved away from property rights
classifications as determinative in an inquiry into the substantive
fourth amendment right. Both new standards broadened the scope
of protection afforded, with the Jones standard increasing the
number of defendants who could invoke the protection, and the Katz
standard increasing the scope of expectations which would be pro-
tected. Thus, the Court was moving in the same direction but along
two different paths. It was not until its decision in Rakas that the
Court followed the urging of Justice Harlan in Alderman and merg-
ed the two inquiries.
In Rakas, a majority of the Court viewed the procedural change
of subsuming standing into the substantive inquiry" as a "better
analysis forthrightly focus[ing] on the extent of a particular defen-
dant's rights . . . rather than on any theoretically separate, but
invariably intertwined concept of standing."'" By its matter-of-fact
treatment of standing, the Court pronounced that only one standard
and inquiry need be considered in search and seizure situations: that
of the existence of "a legitimate expectation of privacy."'2
The language used in the Court's proclaimed standard is not
new and is most visible in Katz, particularly in Justice Harlan's con-
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), with a different result. In Simmons the
offense was a nonpossessory one. However, the defendant faced the same problem
because the evidence of the crime seized was in a suitcase alleged to be his. In order
for the defendant to obtain standing to suppress the evidence, he would have had to
claim a possessory interest in the suitcase. He was thus forced to either give up a
seemingly valid fourth amendment claim or in effect waive his fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. The Court felt this situation intolerable and held
that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth
amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial
on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection. Id. at 394. Whether or not the
automatic standing holding of Jones survives Simmons in light of Rakas is an open
question. See 99 S. Ct. at 426 n.4.
40. Neither Justice White's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Stevens, 99 S. Ct. at 437-44, nor Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined
by the Chief Justice, 99 S. Ct. at 434-37, addressed this change.
41. 99 S. Ct. at 428. "The question necessarily arises whether it serves any useful
analytical purpose to consider . . . a matter of standing distinct from the merits of a
defendant's Fourth Amendment right." Id.
42. To Justice White's charge that the Court was abandoning an "easily applied"
legitimately on the premises standard with a rule difficult to administer, 99 S. Ct. at
443 (White, J., dissenting), the Court responded that the fourth amendment analysis
embraced in Rakas is one which in application will involve "all of the problems of line
drawing which must be faced in any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amend-
ment," and that "fine lines" will have to be "drawn in Fourth Amendment cases as in
other areas of the law." 99 S. Ct. at 432. The Court further conceded that these lines
must separate "one shade of gray from another." Id.
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curring opinion;" nonetheless, its present interpretation is unclear.
It was in the Katz majority opinion that the Court most clearly
broke away from property rights classifications in determining
fourth amendment protection; however, the dissent in Rakas ada-
mantly charged that the majority opinion in Rakas "holds that the
Fourth Amendment protects property, not people ... [and that one]
may not . . . challenge a search . . . unless he happens to own or
have a possessory interest.""
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, countered in a foot-
note: "[O]ur dissenting Brethren repeatedly criticize our 'holding' ....
We have rendered no such 'holding' . .. [that the fourth amendment
protects property, not people]. To the contrary, we have taken pains
to reaffirm the statements in Jones and Katz that 'arcane
distinctions developed in property ... law ... ought not to control.' " 5
Also in footnote, the majority further addressed the role of property
rights in establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy:
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a
source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to
concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings
that are recognized and permitted by society ... Expectations of
privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment, of course, need
not be based on a common-law interest in real or personal prop-
erty or on the invasion of such an interest .... [Tihe Court has
not altogether abandoned use of property concepts in determin-
ing the presence or absence of the privacy interests protected
by that Amendment .... [Elven a property interest in premises
may not be sufficient to establish a legitimate expectation of
privacy with respect to particular items located on the premises
or activity conducted thereon. 6
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, addressed the inter-
pretation to be given the new standard and pointed out that "prop-
erty rights reflect society's explicit recognition of a person's authority
to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore should be con-
sidered in determining whether an individual's expectations of
privacy are reasonable."'7 He argued that no single factor "invari-
ably will be determinative.' 8 "The ultimate question ... is whether
43. See text at notes 29-35, supra.
44. 99 S. Ct. at 437 (White, J., dissenting).
45. 99 S. Ct. at 434 n.17.
46. Id. at 431 n.12.
47. 99 S. Ct. at 435 (Powell, J., concurring).
48. Id
1980]
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one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in
light of all the surrounding circumstances."' 9
In attempting to reconcile the proclaimed Rakas standard with
the jurisprudence, the Court looked to the surrounding cir-
cumstances found in Jones to limit Jones to its facts rather than to
expressly overrule it." In thus limiting Jones, the Court pointed out-
that "[w]e would not wish to be understood as saying that legitimate
presence on the premises is irrelevant to one's expectation of
privacy, but it cannot be deemed controlling."5 1 Therefore, the Jones
"legitimately on the premises" language is no longer the test to
gauge fourth amendment protection,52 but rather it has become one
of many factors to be considered in the inquiry into the existence of
a legitimate expectation of privacy. In applying the proclaimed stan-
dard, the Court in Rakas determined that as the petitioners
asserted ownership of neither the rifle, the shells, nor the car," and
as they had made no showing of a legitimate expectation of privacy"
with respect to those parts of the automobile which were searched,55
the search and seizure "did not violate any rights of [the] peti-
tioners.""9
Although a determination of the ultimate impact of the Court's
decision in Rakas will have to await future case law, some results of
the opinion are apparent even now. By subsuming standing into the
fourth amendment substantive right, the Court has transformed
standing, which in the context of fourth amendment violations had
been an outgrowth of judicial self-restraint,57 into a constitutional
49. Id. at 433.
50. 99 S. Ct. at 430. "We think that Jones on its facts merely stands for the
unremarkable proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place
other than his home ....Id.
51. Id. at 433.
52. The Court in Rakas also addressed the automatic standing holding of Jones.
See note 39, supra. While not expressly overruling this holding, the Court called its
validity into question. See 99 S. Ct. at 426 n.4.
53. 99 S. Ct. at 433.
54. "Petitioners claimed only that they were 'legitimately on [the] premises' and
did not claim that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas of the
car which were searched." Id. at 434 n.17. This qualification by a majority of the Court
might begin to address some of the questions raised by the dissent. "If the nonowner
were the spouse or child of the owner, would the Court recognize a sufficient interest?
If so, would distant relatives somehow have more of an expectation of privacy than
close friends? What if the nonowner were driving with the owner's permission?" 99 S.
Ct. at 443 (White, J., dissenting).
55. 99 S. Ct. at 433-34.
56. Id at 434.
57. See note 15, supra. In Jeffers and Goldstein, the Court demanded standing as
a matter of course without stating why standing was necessary. In Jones the Court
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substantive right. Justice Rehnquist argued that this action should
effect no change on this Court's future decisions as it is merely a
shift to a "better analysis""6 which "will produce no additional situa-
tions in which evidence must be excluded." 9 Nonetheless, the lower
courts might be faced with certain difficulties in implementing the
new analysis.
One difficulty in the routine application of the Rakas procedural
change lies with the status of the burden of proof required in search
and seizure situations. Traditionally, there were two distinct inquir-
ies"0 each with a different burden of proof. When asserting standing
the defendant had the burden of proof to show himself a person ag-
grieved.61 As to the inquiry into the alleged violation of the substan-
tive right, after standing had been proved, the prosecution had the
directly addressed the issue of standing, saying it was "to be decided with reference to
Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." 362 U.S. at 260. This rule per-
mits a motion to suppress evidence to be filed by "[a] person aggrieved by an unlawful
search or seizure." FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e). The Jones Court declared that "[i]n order to
qualify as a 'person aggrieved by an unlawful search or seizure' one must have been a
victim of a search or seizure." 362 U.S. at 261. The Court determined that "Rule 41(e)
applies the general principle that a party will not be heard to claim a constitutional
protection unless he 'belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection
is given.' " Id. at 261, citing Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. 152, 160 (1907) (emphasis
added). Hatch dealt with the commerce clause and state taxation of stock transfers. In
that case the Court stated that "there is a point beyond which this court does not con-
sider arguments . . . for the purpose of invalidating the tax laws of a state on constitu-
tional grounds ... unless the party setting up the unconstitutionality of the state law
belongs to the class for whose sake the constitutional protection is given." 204 U.S. at
160. In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936), Justice
Brandeis, concurring, stated that "[tihe Court developed, for its own governance in the
cases . . . within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing
upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision. They
are: .... The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one
who fails to show that he is injured by its operation." 297 U.S. at 346 (Brandeis, J.,
concurring), citing Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U.S. at 160-61.
Therefore, it is arguable that the "general principle" noted in Jones as "standing" is
a Court-developed rule, which was developed in a non-criminal context, carried for-
ward to criminal justice cases with Jones, and embraced as proper in the criminal
justice area in Alderman and Hayden. See note 15, supra. Now, as a result of Rakas it
has become a part of a required constitutional inquiry.
58. 99 S. Ct. at 428. Justice Rehnquist argued: "We can think of no decided cases
from this Court that would have come out differently had we concluded . . . that the
type of standing requirement discussed in Jones is more properly subsumed under
substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine." Id
59. Id.
60. See id. at 428 n.7.
61. Id. at 424 n.1. "The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of
establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged
search or seizure." Id. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 389-90; Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. at 260-61.
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burden of proof to establish that a warrantless search was not un-
reasonable. 2 Now that the Court in Rakas has subsumed the
standing inquiry into the substantive right inquiry, who now bears
the burden of proof? The Court in none of its opinions addresses this
important question. The only guidance is the majority's emphasis on
what the defendants did and did not assert." Whether this emphasis
means that the Court will look to the defendant to prove a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy rather than to the prosecution to prove
that the search was not unreasonable because of the absence of a
legitimate expectation of privacy is unclear."' That the Court may
have overlooked this consequence of its actions, believing as Justice
Rehnquist argued, that no change would ensue, is also uncertain.
Nonetheless, this situation brought about by the merging of the pro-
cedural and substantive inquiries does create confusion in the prac-
tical application of Rakas.
The Court with its decision in Rakas has defined the scope of
access to fourth amendment protection, formerly considered under
the rubric "standing," as being intimately related to the interpreta-
tion accorded the substantive right. The interpretation presently
embraced by the Court is a narrower one than in the past, thus
allowing less access to the afforded protection. 5 Any doubts as to
62. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1960); United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. at 51. See The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978
Term-Pretrial Criminal Procedure, 39 LA. L. REV. 917, 917-18 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Pretrial Criminal Procedure].
In Louisiana, article 703(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that in a
motion to suppress "the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the grounds of
his motion." Notwithstanding this provision, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held in
State v. Franklin, 353 So. 2d 1315 (La. 1977), "that once the defendant makes the ini-
tial showing at a motion to suppress hearing that a warrantless search occurred, the
burden shifts to the State to affirmatively show that the search is justified." Id. at
1318-19.
Professor Lamonica suggested that in light of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969), the court in Franklin recognized that the article 703(c) burden is met when the
defendant shows that no warrant was obtained and the seizure occurred, and once this
is done "the state must 'affirmatively show that the search is justified.' " Pretrial
Criminal Procedure, supra at 918, citing.State v. Franklin, 353 So. 2d at 1318-19.
Since Louisiana in its new constitution expands standing, and embraces a broader
interpretation of the substantive right than is required by the United States Constitu-
tion, see text at notes 70-73, infra, then theoretically, the Court's treatment in Rakas
of its procedural rule, "standing," shoulJ have no effect on Louisiana's treatment of
standing and the right protected.
63. See 99 S. Ct. at 424 n.1, 425 n.2, 430 n.11 & 434 n.17. See also text at notes
53-56, supra.
64. In the later case of Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979), dealing with
governmental access to telephone company records containing the numbers dialed
from one's home phone, the Court again did not address this question.
65. The protection afforded by the fourth amendment since Mapp v. Ohio, 367
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the Court's intent to narrow the scope from the previously accepted
standard of Jones were dispelled with its express statement that
"[t]o the extent that the language [from Jones] might be read more
broadly [than outlined by the Court,] . ..we now expressly reject
[it]." 6
The scope of protection embraced by the Court does not, as was
speculated because of the language of Jones, include "standing to
raise vicarious Fourth Amendment claims.""7 The Court felt this
would "necessarily mean a more widespread invocation of the exclu-
sionary rule." 8 Evidently the Court is not willing to increase the
scope of the protection and thus the application of the exclusionary
rule, arguing that "[we] are not convinced that the additional
benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants
would justify further encroachment upon the public interest in pros-
ecuting those accused of crime . . . on the basis of all the evi-
dence ... ."69 Therefore, with its decision in Rakas, the Court has
refused to expand access to the exclusionary rule.
The direction of the Court in search and seizure situations is
particularly important to note in Louisiana as the state's new con-
stitution heralds a much broader standing requirement than was
afforded by the accepted application of Jones or is afforded by the
composite standard of Rakas.0
The last sentence of [article one, section five of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974] abolishes the federally developed standing
requirement by which a defendant asserting a fourth amend-
ment objection was required to show that he was the 'victim of a
U.S. 643 (1961) (state courts), and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal
courts), has been the exclusionary rule requiring the suppression of evidence obtained
from a search or seizure violative of the fourth amendment.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 426.
67. Id. at 427.
68. Id.
69. Id., quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 174-75. The Court in the
majority opinion went on to argue that "[ejach time the exclusionary rule is applied it
exacts a substantial social cost for the vindication of Fourth Amendment rights." 99 S.
Ct. at 427. This reasoning is reminiscent of the Court's arguments in such cases as
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974), as well'as Alderman, in which the Court weighed the benefit of enforcing the
exclusionary rule against the cost to society which would be exacted by the enforce-
ment and determined not to enforce the rule in the particular instances addressed.
70. LA. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides:
Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications, houses,
papers, and effects against 'unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of
privacy .... Any person adversely affected by a search or seizure conducted in
violation of this Section shall have standing to raise its illegality in the appro-
priate court.
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search or seizure . . . . It provides that 'any person adversely
affected' has standing .... The scope of the exclusionary rule is
thus enlarged ... 7
Therefore, while the Supreme Court through Rakas has reduced the
class of persons having "standing," Louisiana has "expanded the
class of persons having standing ... and consequently [has] expanded
the scope of [the protection of] the exclusionary rule."72 This broad
divergence between Louisiana's treatment of search and seizure
cases and the Supreme Court's treatment has led Louisiana to
embrace "an exclusionary rule which would not be available under
Mapp."73 Thus Louisiana courts and federal courts are forced even
farther apart regarding the interpretation and protection afforded
in search and seizure situations. This divergence will require that
future Louisiana courts rely almost exclusively upon Louisiana law
and jurisprudence in deciding search and seizure cases.
Rebecca F. Doherty
THE PRUDENT OPERATOR STANDARD: DOES IT
INCLUDE A DUTY TO USE ENHANCED RECOVERY?
Plaintiff, successor in title to a grantor of an oil and gas lease on
an eighty acre tract of land in the Bellevue Field, Bossier Parish,
Louisiana, sued to cancel the lease because of the lessee's failure
and refusal to put into operation a fireflood program of oil recovery,
in addition to primary recovery methods previously used. The trial
court cancelled the lease, finding that the lessee had not acted as a
reasonable, prudent operator as required by Mineral Code article
122. The Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed and
held that a mineral lease may be cancelled for failure to use
technologically current methods of enhanced recovery. Waseco
Chemical & Supply Co. v. Bayou State Oil Corp., 371 So. 2d 305 (La.
App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 656 (La. 1979).
Virtually all oil producing states, including Louisiana, have
imposed on the mineral lessee an obligation to develop and operate
71. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
LA. L. REV. 1, 23-24 (1974).
72. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Te'r--Pre-
Trial Criminal Procedure, 37 LA. L. REv. 535, 543-44 (1977).
73. Id. at 544.
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